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THE PAST DECADE AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY:  
POPULIST CHALLENGES TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY  
 
Vivien A.  Schmidt, Boston University 
 
 
Not everything in this ‘transcendent decade’ is taking us towards a new Enlightenment.  
Governance and democracy face particular challenges.  The rise of what is often called 
‘populism’ constitutes the biggest challenge to political stability and democracy seen 
since the 1920s or 1930s.1   
 
The British vote to exit the EU followed by the election of Donald Trump to the US 
Presidency took mainstream politics (and pundits) by surprise.  And this was only the 
beginning of the tsunami that has since swept across continental Europe.  Emmanuel 
Macron’s victory in the French presidential election turned out to be only a momentary 
reprieve, as the populist extremes became (part of) governing majorities in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Austria, and Italy, while gaining ground everywhere else.   In some 
countries, most notably Hungary and Poland, populist governments are undermining the 
basic institutions of liberal democracy.  And in so doing, they seek to emulate the anti-
democratic, authoritarian drift of their neighbors to the East, including Turkey and Russia.  
 
The voices of populist dissent may speak in different languages but they convey the same 
sets of messages: against immigration and open borders, globalization and free trade, 
Europeanization and the euro. They draw from the same range of sources: the economics 
of those feeling ‘left behind,’ the sociology of those worried about the ‘changing faces of 
the nation,’ or the politics of those who want to ‘take back control.’  Most also articulate 																																																								1	Canovan 1999; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Müller 2016; Judis 2016; Levitsky and 
Ziblatt 2018; Eichengreen 2018	
their outrage in similar ways, using rhetorical strategies that deploy ‘uncivil’ words and 
‘fake news’ to create ‘post-truth’ environments that reject experts, excoriate established 
media, and demonize conventional political elites and parties. These dissenting voices, 
long isolated on the margins, now constitute an existential threat to the long-standing 
consensus on how to conduct politics and manage the economy in liberal democracies.  
They challenge the institutional commitments of political liberalism to tolerant, balanced 
governance and the ideational preferences of economic neo-liberalism for open borders 
and free trade.  
 
In short, over the past decade, what had long looked like disparate groups of dissatisfied 
citizens marginalized on the sidelines of mainstream politics, supporting motley crews of 
anti-establishment leaders and small extremist parties, has coalesced into an all-out 
assault on liberal democracy and democratic capitalism. The main question to answer 
therefore is:  Why and how have populists succeeded today in channeling public fear and 
anger in ways that have gained them unparalleled influence and even propelled some of 
their anti-system parties into power?  
 
Potential answers abound.  For some, ‘it’s the economy, stupid,’ especially following the 
2008 US financial crisis and the 2010 EU sovereign debt crisis.  Fro others, it’s the 
‘cultural backlash’ of citizens clinging to their social status and worried about rising 
immigration.  For yet others, it follows from the hollowing out of mainstream political 
institutions and party politics, accompanied by the political frustration of citizens who 
feel their voices are not heard and their complaints ignored by national politicians and 
supranational technocrats.  So which is right?   
 
All in fact offer valuable insights into the many different reasons for the populist tsunami.  
But although these analyses help us understand the sources of citizens’ underlying anger, 
they can’t explain why populism has surfaced today with such intensity and in so many 
different forms in different national contexts.  For an answer to why now, in these ways, 
with this kind of populism, we need to delve more deeply into the nature and scope of 
populism.  This means taking seriously the substantive content of populist leaders’ ideas 
and discourses championing ‘the people’ against the elites while contesting 
institutionalized expertise.  It requires investigating populists’ discursive processes of 
interaction, such as their strategies of communication using new media to consolidate 
activist social movements and party networks as well as traditional media to disseminate 
their messages more widely.  But any explanation of populist success also demands 
consideration of the electoral promises generally long on anti-system complaints but 
vague on policies (at least when outside power); investigating how populist 
electioneering may affect mainstream politics; and of course examining what happens if 
and when populists gain power.  
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the sources of populist discontent, economic, 
socio-cultural, and political, along with the precipitating role of recent crises.  It follows 
with an analysis of the defining features of today’s populism, and how these have 
constituted existential challenges to liberal democracy.  These include the style of 
populist leaders’ discourse; the post-truth content and processes of populist 
communication, and the connections between populists’ promises and their actions.  The 
conclusion asks whether this is a momentary phenomenon, or a new moment in history, 
and asks what forces may determine the future possibilities.   
 
 
The Sources of Populism 
 
How do we explain the meteoric rise of populism over the past decade?  For this, we need 
first to consider the sources of discontent.  These are economic, resulting from rising 
inequalities and socio-economic deprivations since the 1980s; sociological, related to 
concerns about status, identity, and nationhood in a context of increasing levels of 
immigration; and political, generated by citizens’ growing dissatisfaction with 
mainstream politics and policies and loss of trust in government and political elites.  
 
Economic Sources of Discontent 
The economic sources of populism are wide-ranging.  They include the rise of inequality 
due to the accumulation of capital by the ‘one percent’, famously investigated by Thomas 
Piketty,2 accompanied by an increase in poverty due to regressive taxation plans and cost 
cutting that transformed the postwar welfare state into a less generous system, with lower 
pensions and less security.3  Moreover, globalization has created a wide range of ‘losers’ 
in de-industrialized areas, while generating a sense of insecurity for the middle classes, 
worried about losing jobs and status,4 or joining the ‘precariat’.5  The economic 
disruptions from globalization, in particular the shift of manufacturing from advanced to 
developing countries, have led to more and more people feeling ‘left behind’,6 and 
produced a ‘race to the bottom’ of lower skilled groups, especially of younger males.7 
 
Underpinning these socio-economic problems is the resilience of neo-liberal ideas.8 
These began by promoting global free trade and market liberalization in the 1980s and 
ended with the triumph of financial capitalism and ‘hyper-globalization’.9 The financial 
crisis that began in 2007/2008 did little to moderate such ideas, while in the Eurozone 
crisis, the EU’s ‘ordo-liberal’ ideas promoting austerity policies have had particularly 
deleterious consequences, including low growth, high unemployment (in particular in 
Southern Europe), and rising poverty and inequality.10   The US and the UK have not 
fared much better, despite more pragmatic policies that mixed neo-liberal and neo-
Keynesian ideas that allowed these countries to benefit from a more robust recovery with 
lower unemployment and better job growth.  But neither has done much to alter its 
finance-driven model of capitalism,11 and both have higher levels of inequality than their 
European counterparts.  
 																																																								2	Piketty 2014	3	 Hacker 2006; Hemerijck 2013	4	 Kalleberg 2009; Prosser 2016	5	 Standing 2011	6	 Gilpin 2000; Hay and Wincott 2012	7	Eberstadt 2016	8	 Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Mirowski 2013	9	 Stiglitz 2002, 2016; Rodrik 2011	10	 Scharpf 2014; Matthijs and Blyth 2015; Stiglitz 2016	11	 Hay and Smith 2013	
The economic sources of populist discontent are many, then.  But they leave open a 
number of questions.  For example, why did populism rise in Eastern Europe despite an 
unprecedented economic boom powered by globalization and EU integration? Why in 
Sweden did populists not emerge after the drastic 1992 crisis but over the course of one 
of Europe’s most remarkable recoveries?  And Italy has seen worse economic crises 
before, so why now?  Finally, the new ‘losers’ of globalization have been angry about 
their loss of income and status ever since the triumph of neoliberalism since the 1980s, so 
why has their unhappiness translated itself into this set of political attitudes and/or 
political action today?  Why, holding these views, didn’t the challenge populist parties 
come sooner? 
 
Socio-Cultural Sources of Discontent 
Explanations for the rise of populism are not just economic; they are also socio-cultural.  
The populist backlash has been fueled by another aspect of neo-liberal globalization: 
cross-border mobility and the increases in immigration.  Nostalgia for a lost past along 
with fear of the ‘other’ has resulted in the targeting of immigrants groups.12 Certain 
groups feel their national identity or sovereignty to be under siege in the face of 
increasing flows of immigrants.13  And this is often accompanied by rising nativist 
resentments tied to perceptions that  ‘others’—immigrants, non-whites, women—are 
‘cutting in the line,’ and taking the social welfare benefits they alone deserve.14  Welfare 
‘patriotism’ or ‘chauvinism’ has been rearing its head not only on the right side of the 
spectrum in the US, the UK, or in France but also on the left, in Nordic countries, notably 
in Denmark.  
 
Discontent over immigration may undoubtedly also stem from the socio-economic 
problems of those ‘left behind,’ worried about loss of jobs to immigrants, and unwilling 
to reward them with welfare benefits.  But here we are talking about the socio-cultural 
concerns of once-predominant sectors of the population worried about what immigration 																																																								12	 Hochschild and Mollenkopt 2009	13	 Berezin 2009; McClaren 2012	14	 Hochshild 2016	
will do to their status.  These are the people—older, less educated, white, male—whose 
worldview is threatened by changing demographics resulting from rising immigrant 
populations.  Often, these are the very same people who are equally troubled by 
intergenerational shifts to post-materialist values such as cosmopolitanism and 
multiculturalism.15  They can be people who are well off financially, but subscribe to 
socially conservative philosophies and/or oppose socially liberal policy programs. These 
are the people who, while they may remain in favor of economic liberalism, focused on 
ideas about individual responsibility in the economic realm, reject social liberalism.  
 
Social liberalism underpins ideas about individuals’ rights to self-determination, which 
include the expectation of respect for differences not only involving race and ethnicity 
but also gender, and which have been accompanied by expectations of  ‘political 
correctness’ in language. Particularly contentious have been questions of women’s rights 
when related to abortion and LBGT rights when involving gay marriage and child 
adoption.   Such questions have played themselves out in the US in particular, including 
the ‘bathroom’ wars in high schools (about which bathrooms may transsexuals and non-
gender-identifying use).  Such ‘identity politics’ of the left has sometimes been blamed 
for right-wing conservatives’ openness to populism on the extreme right.16 
 
The various socio-cultural counter-politics of identity provide another plausible 
explanation for the rise of populism. But here, too, the question of ‘why now?’ remains.  
This kind of politics has been around for a very long time, fed by ethnocentric definitions 
of ‘us’ versus ‘the other,’ most notably theorized by Carl Schmitt. After all, particular 
fears and negative perceptions related to immigration have been around for decades, and 
more recently at least since the advent of demographic decline, the rise of terrorism, the 
mass migration of millions of poor East Europeans (including almost a million Muslims 
from Bosnia and Albania).  And further, why is the socio-cultural demand for populism 
so acute in some countries affected by mass migration (e.g., Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
France) but not in others (i.e., Spain)?   																																																								15	 Inglehart and Norris 2016	16	 E.g., Lilla 2017	
 Political Sources of Discontent 
Finally, the discontents are also political, as people feel their voices no longer matter in 
the political process.  In some cases, citizens feel that they have lost control as a result of 
globalization and/or Europeanization—that powerful people at a distance make decisions 
that have effects over their everyday lives that they don’t like or even understand.17  
These include not just global or regional decision-making bodies but also big businesses 
able to use the political system to their advantage, whether in not paying taxes (e.g., 
Apple) or to get the regulations they want, regardless of their effects on social and 
environmental policies.18   
 
Popular disaffection is also locally generated, related to national political systems.  Some 
issues are related to policies.  Political parties have increasingly appeared to be 
unresponsive to their constituencies’ concerns, delivering policies that are seen to serve 
the elites rather the ordinary citizen.19  Others stem from structural changes in political 
institutions.  Citizens’ ability to express their disenchantment has, ironically, been 
amplified by the ‘democratization’ of the electoral rules.  By opening up access through 
primaries and referenda, where the most dissatisfied tend to be more motivated to turn 
out to vote, party leadership contests have largely brought victory for representatives of 
more extreme positions.  This has in turn weakened political parties as representative 
institutions at the same time that it has made it more difficult to forge alliances ‘across 
the aisle’.20  Additionally, the supranationalization of decision-making in global and/or 
European institutions has also had its toll mainstream party politics, by hollowing it, 
Political leaders find themselves with the predicament of being forced to choose between 
being responsive to citizens, as their elected representatives, or being responsible by 
honoring supranational commitments.21   
 																																																								17	Schmidt 2006; 2017	18	 Hacker and Pierson 2010; Culpepper 2011	19	 Berman 2018	20	 Rosenbluth and Shapiro 2018	21	 Mair 2013	
Politics pure and simple also matters, of course.  Mainstream political parties have 
seemed at a loss with regard to how to respond to populist challengers on the right and on 
the left.  The center right’s political strategy has until relatively recently entailed a refusal 
to govern with the extreme right at the same time that it has often taken up their issues in 
attempts to reclaim their constituencies, in particular with regard to immigration.  And 
while the center right has thus appeared to chase after the extreme right on the hot button 
issues, the center left has frequently seemed to chase after the center right on those self-
same issues.   
 
Complicating matters for the European Union is the supranational nature of decision-
making, and how this has affected national politics.  A major shift in the structure of 
national politics across Europe has occurred as a result of new electoral divides.  These 
involve crosscutting cleavages between traditional political divisions based on adherence 
to right/left political parties and newer identity-related divisions based on more closed, 
xenophobic and authoritarian values versus more open, cosmopolitan, and liberal 
values.22  The issues most in focus for the xenophobic/authoritarian side of the division 
began with immigration.  But increasingly over the years, the European Union has 
become an equally politicized issue, as citizens have gone from the ‘permissive 
consensus’ of the past to the current ‘constraining dissensus’.23 Public opinion surveys 
and polls clearly chart citizens’ loss of trust in political elites and of faith in their national 
democracies, let alone the EU.24  
 
In the European Union, multi-level governance puts great strain on member-state 
democracies, albeit each for different reasons of history, culture, and politics.25  Note, 
however, that the citizens’ feelings of disenfranchisement (and the realities) are not only 
due to the EU’s multi-level political system. While Brexit was probably the summum of 
the EU’s populist revolt (until the Italian election of March 2018, when Euroskeptic 
parties gained a governing majority), Trump’s election in the US was fueled by very 																																																								22	Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi et al. 2012	23	 Hooghe and Marks 2009	24	 Pew and Eurobarometer polls, 2008-2018	25	 Schmidt 2006	
much the same sentiments. They are in large part a consequence of the growing 
supranationalization of decision-making in an era of globalization, where governments 
have exchanged national autonomy for shared supranational authority in order to regain 
control over the forces they themselves unleashed through national policies of 
liberalization and deregulation.26 And with liberalization and deregulation, fueled by neo-
liberal philosophies,27 also came technocratic decision-making, which promoted the 
depoliticization of policies and processes, along with the downgrading of politics.28  As a 
result, mainstream politics has found itself under attack from two sides: the rise of 
populist parties on the one hand, the rise of technocracy on the other.29 The only thing 
these two forces hold in common is their rejection of mainstream party politics, their 
increasingly negative impact on such politics, and their deleterious effects on liberal 
democracy.30  The danger, as Yascha Mounk argues, is that liberal democracies may end 
up either with illiberal democracies run by populist demagogues or undemocratic 
liberalisms governed by technocratic elites.31 
 
In sum, the depoliticizing effects of the supranationalization of decision-making together 
with the weakening of representative party institutions offer equally powerful 
explanations for how and why populism has emerged as a major challenge to mainstream 
parties and politics.  But again, the question is why, given that this has been a long-term 
process, aggrieved citizens didn’t vote for populist parties on the right wing extremes 
sooner.  Cas Mudde suggests this may be a problem on the supply-side, i.e., the absence 
of charismatic leaders attractive to the general voter for whom to vote32 (despite the 
‘coterie charisma’ of some leaders felt by hard-core activists).33  But if so, then the 
further question is why such populist leaders—some new but many still around after 
many years—have taken the world by storm only now.  																																																								26	 See, e.g., de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Schmidt 2002	27	 Schmidt and Thatcher 2013	28	 de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Flinders and Wood 2014; Fawcett and Marsh 2014	29	 Caramani 2017	30	 Zürn 2016; Kriesi 2016; Hobolt 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2009	31	Mounk 2018	32	Mudde  2017b, p. 615	33	Eatwell 2017	
 But in order to answer this question, we need to focus in on populism itself.  Up to this 
point, we have looked at the sources of populist discontent by delving deeply into the 
causes of citizen’s discontent in three different areas—economic, social, and political.  
By focusing on the sources of the problem, the discussion tends to take populism as a 
given.  Only by taking the ideas and discourse of populist movements and leaders 
seriously, however, can we come closer to understanding why populist forces have been 
able to exploit the current rise in citizen discontent for their own purposes. 
 
 
Conceptualizing Populism and its Effects 
 
Public and scholarly interest in the development of populism has spawned a veritable 
cottage industry of books and articles on the topic. Conceptually, scholars have provided 
important insights into the nature and scope of populism in Europe and America.34  
Empirically, analysts have charted the rise of populism on the extremes of the left and the 
right, although the large majority are focused on the anti-immigrant, Euroskeptic, anti-
Euro and anti-EU parties of the far right.35  Commentators have additionally shown that 
the problems generated by populism can be seen not just in the policy proposals that go 
counter to long agreed principles of human rights, democratic processes, and the liberal 
world order but also in the new ‘uncivil’ language of politics,36 the politics of ‘bullshit,’ 
and the dangers of ‘fake news’ circulating via the media to create a ‘post-truth’ world.37 
 
The high number and wide range of such works suggests that there is no one agreed-upon 
approach to understanding populism but many possible, most with negative connotations.  
Some take us all the way back to Richard Hofstädter’s depiction in the 1960s of ‘agitators 
																																																								34	  E.g., Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Mudde and Kalwasser 2012; Müller 2016; 
Judis 2016; Schmidt 2017; Mudde 2017b	35	 E.g., Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013; Hobolt 2015; Kriesi 2014, 2016; Mudde 2017a	36	 Thompson 2016; Mutz 2015	37	Frankfurt 2005; Ball 2017; D’Ancona 2017	
with paranoid tendencies’.38  Although that purely negative view of populism has been 
critiqued and updated,39 in particular by differentiating left wing from right wing versions, 
all populism has one thing in common.  It is the expression of discontent by those who 
feel dispossessed, given voice by leaders whose discourses of dissent resonate with ‘the 
people’s’ angry reactions against the status quo.  But beyond this, populism can follow 
many different avenues, depending upon the political, social, historical, institutional, and 
cultural context.  
 
In taking account of this complexity, we can identify four key features of populism:  First, 
populist leaders claim sole representation of ‘the people’ against elites and other ‘threats.’ 
Second, they engage in all-out assaults on expertise and unbiased ‘facts’ and truth with 
‘uncivil’ language and ‘incivil’ conduct that constitute a challenge to liberal tolerance and 
commitment to impartial information and scientific knowledge.  Third, they get their 
messages out through new strategies of communication, facilitated by the new social 
media such as Twitter feeds and Facebook as well as the traditional broadcast and print 
media.  And fourth, they articulate many more anti-system complaints about what is 
wrong than spell out proposals about how to fix it at least until they gain access to power, 
at which point they may either row back or fast forward on anti-liberal policies.   
 
Populist Leaders’ Style of Discourse 
Much attention in the literature on populism focuses on the first characteristic of 
populism, the appeals to ‘the people’ by leaders whose discourses blame ‘corrupt’ elites 
and unfair institutions for all their problems while enumerating a wide range of threats to 
national well-being, however that may be construed.40  Most recent theoretical analyses 
of populism portray such discursive leadership as a danger for liberal democracy. Jan-
Werner Müller, for example, defines populism rather narrowly as a dangerous anti-elitist, 
anti-democratic, and anti-pluralist political philosophy, in which leaders claim an 
exclusive representation of ‘the people’—with only some of the people counting as the 																																																								38	Hofstädter 1964	39	 E.g., Kazin 1995	40	 Canovan 1999; Taggart 2000; Weyland 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2007; 
Mudde 2005, 2017a	
‘true people’ for whom populist leaders claim to speak in the name of the people as a 
whole.41 This definition is close to that of Pierre André Taguieff, in his classic study of 
the National Front as a ‘national-populist party’ in which the discourse of the demagogic 
leader is defined by a rhetoric that identifies with ‘the people,’ claiming that their ideas 
are his, his ideas are theirs, with no concern for the truth, but rather to persuade through 
propagandistic formulas.42   
 
A similar such approach from another philosophical tradition is that of Ernesto Laclau.43  
He argues that populism is identifiable not so much by the contents or even the 
identification of an enemy as by its conceptual anchor (‘empty signifier’), which stands 
as a universal representation for all other demands to which it is seen as equivalent.44  
Examples might be a general issue such as ‘globalization,’ phrases or slogans such as 
Brexit supporters’ ‘Take back control’ and Donald Trump’s ‘Make America Great 
Again’,45 or the True Finns’ catchphrase for the EU as ‘the heart of darkness’.46  
However, it could even consist of a string of words that indicate a particular set of values, 
as in the speech by Italian Interior Minister and head of the League, Matteo Salvini at a 
rally in Pontida, who declared: “Next year’s [EP] election will be a referendum between 
the Europe of the elites, banks, finance, mass migration and precariousness versus the 
Europe of peoples, work, tranquility, family and future”.47 
 
For many, populism is an unqualified negative phenomenon: anti-democratic, anti-
pluralist, and moralistic in extremely dangerous ways.   This is particularly the case 
where the focus is on the rise of the ‘new populism’ of extreme right parties and their 
links to xenophobic nationalist ideas.48   These include far right parties with reasonable 
longevity, such as France’s National Front (now National Rally), Austria’s Freedom 																																																								41	Müller 2016	42	Taguieff 1984; see also discussion in Jäger 2018	43	Laclau 2005, p. 39	44	 See also Panizza 2005	45	Schmidt 2017	46	 Spiegel 2011—cited in Albertazzi and Mueller 2017	47	 Politico July 19, 2018	48	 E.g., Taggart 2017; see also Ignazi 1992; Betz 1993	
Party, the Danish People’s Party, and the Dutch Party for Freedom;49 relative newcomers 
such as the Finns Party (formerly True Finns), the Sweden Democrats, and the 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Northern Europe; as well as the variety of populist 
parties, new and old, across Central and Eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia;50 along with of course the illiberal governments of Hungary and Poland.51   
 
For others, populism can have a more positive side to it.  This includes the left-wing 
populist governments of Latin America (especially in the 1990s and early 2000s) and the 
inclusionary populisms of Southern Europe, most notably in Spain and Greece.52  As 
some philosophers of the Left such as Chantal Mouffe have argued,53 and many figures in 
the radical left political formations themselves (e.g. Spain’s Podemos and France’s 
France Insoumise) have stressed, some radical left parties embrace the term populism as 
a technique for acquiring power.  They see this as representing the only forceful and 
effective alternative on the left to the “surrender by consensus” carried out by a 
discredited social-democracy transformed by the Third Way. 
 
Populism’s positive effects include giving voice to underrepresented groups, mobilizing 
and representing excluded sections of society, and increasing democratic accountability 
by raising issues ignored or pushed aside by the mainstream parties.  The extremes on the 
left in particular, by mobilizing on bases of social justice and human rights as well as 
against the inequalities caused by the increasing predominance of financial capitalism 
and its accompanying booms and busts, or by the lack of progressive taxation, can serve 
as a positive pull on mainstream parties—on the right as much as the left.  The Occupy 
Movement is a case in point.  However, there are many fewer extreme left parties with a 
significant popular following than extreme right parties, and they are often in EU 
countries that have less political pull or economic weight, in particular those which were 
																																																								49	 Mudde 2017a; Elinas 2010	50	 Minkenberg 2002; Mudde 2005; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009	51	Kelemen 2017	52	 Weyland 2001; Panizza 2005; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012	53	Mouffe 2018	
subject to formal conditionality for bailouts during the Euro crisis (i.e., Greece)54 or 
informal conditionality (most notably Spain).  On balance, parties of the extreme right are 
the ones that appear to have exerted the most influence on political debates and the policy 
agenda so far, by pulling center right mainstream parties closer to their positions, 
especially with regard to opposition to immigration and freedom of movement or 
minority rights.    
 
The existence of different kinds of populist movements on a spectrum from left to right, 
whatever their relative strength, thus suggests that populism is more than just a discursive 
style with an anti-elite message.  Although the style of populists may be similar—such as 
speaking in the name of the people against elites—the content does matter.  If it is more 
progressive and inclusive, it can exert a positive influence on mainstream parties that 
serves to reinforce liberal democracy.  If more regressive and xenophobic, it can exert a 
negative influence.  All populists are not the same, even if their styles may be similar.  
Ideological divides of the left and right remain of great importance, as a recent Pew study 
of citizens’ support for populist versus mainstream parties of the left, right, and center 
concludes.55   
 
Populist Post-Truth  
The next characteristic of populism in our list involves valuing personal experiences over 
knowledge and technical expertise.  Populists tend to discredit experts, intellectuals, and 
those who have traditionally claimed to rely on ‘facts’ and truth.  This fight against 
experts is also at the origins of the many discussions of post-truth and fake news, both 
populists’ accusations against mainstream news outlets of fake news any time the truth 
gets in their way and populist’s own dissemination of fake news through social media as 
well as the traditional media.56  Note however that this approach seems to apply much 
more to contemporary right populists than left populists. 
 																																																								54	Vasilopoulou 2018	55	 Simmons et al. 2018	56	 Ball 2017; D’Ancona 2017	
Populists’ contestation of expertise refers to the fact that they are prone to engage in the 
negation of the scientific/academic knowledge used by established political parties and 
generate their own “alternative” facts and sources of expertise, often by valuing personal 
experiences over “technocratic” expertise. To take but one example, Hungary’s Jobbik 
has its own “institutes” that hybridize uncontested statistical facts on immigration with 
political myths from conspiracy theories lifted from anonymous producers on YouTube.  
 
The problem with this blurring of the lines between fact and fiction, as psychologists 
have pointed out, is that it undermines peoples’ very sense of truth or falsehood, as lies 
repeated many times are believed as ‘true’ even when people know they are not.  Here, 
we can learn a lot from the work of psychologists who focus on the ways in which 
framing and heuristics can affect peoples’ perceptions,57 including when exaggeration or 
hyperbole, say, of the number of migrants entering the EU or the cost of the EU per day 
to the UK leaves the impression on listeners that a very large number is involved, even if 
not as high as alleged.  Even speech patterns, such as incomplete sentences and 
repetitions can serve as effective discursive mechanisms to reinforce a message, whether 
by creating a sense of intimacy as audiences complete the sentence in their heads, or 
appealing to unconscious cognitive mechanisms that serve to reinforce peoples’ 
acceptance of what is said, even (or especially) when they are lies and exaggerations.58   
 
Visual props are also highly effective tools for persuasion, such as posters—most 
notoriously the Swiss extreme right poster on immigration, that was reused by other anti-
immigration parties elsewhere, of three white sheep standing on the national flag symbol 
kicking out a black sheep; the Italian Northern League poster of a native American chief 
in full headdress, with the cut line reading:  ‘They too were subject to immigration, and 
now they are on reservations;’ or Marine Le Pen evoking memories of the Nazis ‘taking 
over the streets,’ by using the same words to refer to Muslim worshippers spilling out of 
a mosque because it was too small to hold them all. 
 																																																								57	 E.g., Kahneman 2011; Lackoff 2014	58	Lackoff 2016—see discussion in Schmidt 2017	
This kind of post-truth approach to the world is part and parcel of the combative ‘uncivil’ 
language and style of discursive interaction, in which bullying, shouting, and blatantly 
violating the rules of ‘political correctness’ through intolerant language contribute to the 
sense that it is not just what you say but how assertively you say it, regardless of the 
validity of the claims, that counts.  The danger here is that it undermines the very 
values—of tolerance, fairness, and even-handed reporting—that have been at the basis of 
liberal democracy since the postwar period.  As Diane Mutz, argues, the incivility in the 
mass media, in particular on confrontation ‘in-your-face’ news programs, is particularly 
detrimental to facilitating respect for oppositional political viewpoints and to citizens' 
levels of trust in politicians and the political process.59   
 
Political Coordination through New Social Media 
Contemporary populism also goes hand in hand with the new ways in which populists 
have learned to use new social media to circulate their messages and broaden their 
networks of support and resource base. Indeed, new media have been invaluable to 
populists’ creation of networks of dissent. Facebook posts alone, for example, create echo 
chambers of support, in particular because large numbers of people get their news (fake 
as well as real) from their ‘friends’ sharing posts.  Populists rely more on new media (e.g. 
YouTube and blogs) and social media (e.g. Twitter and Facebook) than traditional parties 
do. For example, in Spain Podemos faced down the hostility of newspapers and television 
outlets with extreme reliance on hyperactive Facebook posts and YouTube channel 
streaming.  Social media facilitates the discovery of like-minded people across the 
country and the world—enabling populist activists and parties to exponentially increase 
the number of their ‘followers’ and potential supporters. Transnational networks of 
communication enable the spread of populist ideas, reinforcing anger and anti-
establishment sentiment. Crucially, however, this happens not only virtually but also ‘in 
the flesh,’ for example, when extreme right leaders meet in Europe to set strategies for 
EP elections or parliamentary groupings.  A recent case in point is when President 
Trump’s ‘organic intellectual,’ Steve Bannon, traveled throughout Europe to meet with 
																																																								59	Mutz 2015	
and support other populist leaders in their electoral battles, such as Nigel Farage and 
Marine Le Pen, and plans to set up a foundation to provide advice and financial support.60  
 
Populism finds support from activists and social movements on both the left and the right. 
While it is commonly assumed that the activist networks are primarily engaged in left-
leaning causes, right-wing networks have also be active. In the US, the Tea Party is the 
clearest example, managing to unseat enough incumbents in primaries and to win 
elections so as to transform the Republican Party.61  In the UK, the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) was able to set the agenda for the Conservative party and, 
ultimately, the entire nation through the referendum on UK exit from the EU.  In some 
European cases, as in Denmark62 and Germany,63 social movements have been 
instrumental in propelling and normalizing right-wing populism.64  All of this said, 
populism has also been useful to left-wing activists seeking to enliven their support 
base.65 Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primaries of 2016 has sometimes been called a 
populist because of his ability to energize youth via social media, despite or perhaps 
because of promises that mainstream democrats claimed were unrealistic. 
 
Political Communication via the Traditional Media 
The dissemination of populist views does not come just from new social media that create 
new channels of coordination by activists networks, however.  Populists have also 
exploited the old media to get their messages out beyond their ‘true believers’ to the more 
general public.  While Twitter feeds provide a post-modern way for populist leaders to 
speak directly to ‘the people,’ the traditional media also help spread their messages of 
distrust of mainstream parties and politics as well as the media itself. As linguist Ruth 
Wodak  shows, with the ‘politics of fear,’ right wing populist parties have gone from 
fringe voices to persuasive political actors who set the agenda and frame media debates 																																																								60	Hines 2018	61	Skocpol and Williamson 2012	62	 Rydgren 2004	63	 Berbuir et al. 2015	64	 See also Bale et al. 2010	65	March and Mudde 2005	
via the normalization of nationalistic, xenophobic, racist and anti-semitic rhetoric.66  That 
said, dissemination of the populist discourse does have its limits, since some things don’t 
translate—as when US alt right activists sought to use ‘Freddie the Frog’ to reinforce 
extreme right sentiment in France in the run up to the presidential election—not realizing 
that ‘frog’ has long been a negative stereotype applied to the French, and therefore would 
not resonate. 
 
In many countries, the traditional media has become so fragmented that people listen to 
different news programs with completely different slants on the news.  And here again, it 
is mostly the extreme right that largely wins over the left with regard to broadcasting 
presence, whether in terms of talk radio or cable news, whether Radio Maria in Poland or 
Fox News in the US.  Moreover, even the mainstream press and TV conspires to favor 
the extremes on the right, if only inadvertently.  They magnify the audience of populist 
leaders whose political ‘incorrect’ tweets becomes the news story of the day, or they 
reinforce right of center messages when in efforts to appear ‘balanced’ they bring on 
someone from the extreme right and someone from the center—without any airtime for 
the extreme left.67 Naturally, where the populists are in government and control the 
traditional media, then the populist message is the main one heard—as is the case of 
Hungary but arguably even in Italy under Berlusconi’s more benign version of populism.   
 
Media communication has also changed in ways that benefit populist messaging.  The 
short news cycles, combined with the push to speak in thirty second sound-bites, 
privileges simpler messages that ‘sell,’ and this in turn favors populists with their simple 
‘solutions’ to complex problems, easy to articulate without explanation:  such as ‘build a 
wall’ to solve the immigration problem, reverse free trade to protect jobs in the country, 
and so forth.  It takes much longer for mainstream leaders to explain why certain kinds of 
policies are in place, and often these explanations are complex and boring, especially 
when compared to the snappy slogans of the populists. 
 																																																								66	Wodak 2015	67	 Baldwin 2018	
This ‘mediatization’ of political communication generally poses significant problems for 
mainstream party politics and government, primarily by undermining mainstream party 
control of the public sphere and mainstream parties’ ability to set the political agenda. 
Beyond the fact that many other non- or anti-establishment voices are now heard through 
a multiplicity of channels, mainstream leaders have created their own problems as a result 
of their own more populist styles of communication, while the media have only added to 
these through their tendency to focus on leaders’ personality traits while turning the news 
into entertainment.  Beyond this, the social media, social movements, and out-groups 
have also been increasingly subverting the political agenda-setting function of political 
parties.68  Political communication, then, in the dissemination of populist ideas and 
discourse through the ‘bullshit’ of fake news and post-truth in a fragmented media 
landscape, is another key element of populism today. 
 
Connecting Populist Discourses to Actions 
Our last dimension of populism is leaders’ tendency to focus more on denunciating the 
status quo than suggesting remedies, until they gain political power.  Populism most often 
entails, as mentioned above, an ideologically thin discourse characterized more by the 
ardent expression of resentment than by the consistency of the programs.69  The populist 
discourse is therefore more likely to focus on listing grievances and injustices rather than 
laying out policy prescriptions and detailed policy programs. As such, this tends to work 
best for populists in opposition.  Being in government has long entailed compromise or 
even turn-around on cherished policies70—as in the case of the left wing Syriza in Greece.  
But recently, such turn-arounds have become less frequent. 
 
As more and more populist parties have been joining mainstream party coalitions (e.g., 
Austria), or even governing on their own (in Italy, Hungary, and Poland), they have been 
designing and implementing policy agendas that put into effect their anti-liberal ideas, 
often with only the courts to safeguard the rule of law.  Moreover, as the chances of 																																																								68	 Caramani 2017	69	 Also termed a ‘thin-centered ideology’—Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, p. 8, 2013	70	Mudde 2017b	
election are increasing for populists across Europe, all such parties have become more 
specific about their policies and programs.  And they do this even when (or especially 
when) such policies cannot easily be implemented under the existing political order 
because they violate assumptions about sound economics (e.g., promising a high 
guaranteed income and a flat tax—as in the program of the new populist coalition 
government in Italy) or liberal politics (e.g., expelling refugees—the pledge of all right 
wing populist parties). 
 
So exactly what are the potential dangers when populists gain power? David Art (2006) 
has argued that the political strategy of ‘tamed power,’ by bringing populists into 
government to force them to take on their responsibilities via compromise, can backfire, 
by ‘normalizing’ their ideas and thereby opening the way for illiberal ideas to gain sway 
in liberal democracies.71  Müller  goes farther, to contend that rather than encouraging a 
more participative democracy, populists in power will ‘engage in occupying the state, 
mass clientelism and corruption, and the suppression of anything like a critical civil 
society’.72 Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt echo this analysis, insisting that 
‘democracies die’ at the hands of elected populist leaders who then subvert the very 
democratic processes that brought them to power.73   But even short of populist victory, 
when populists are not in power yet, the dangers also come from contagion.  Mainstream 
leaders are themselves increasingly guilty of introducing populist styles of discourse into 
normal politics, with the ‘electoralism’ of political parties’ increasing emphasis on short-
term electoral goals while responding to the public mood as gauged through polling 
instruments.74  This suggests that it is not enough to track leaders’ discourses and the 
ways in which their ideas circulate.  We also need to see whether and/or how they 
influence liberal democracies.  
 
 
Conclusion 																																																								71	 Art 2006; see also Mudde 2017b	72	Müller 2016, p. 102	73	Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018	74	Caramani 2017	
 We are left with a number of questions.  Is this a moment of great transformation, in 
which a new paradigm will emerge out of the ashes of the liberal order, with neo-liberal 
economics, social liberalism, and political liberalism succumbing to the closing of 
borders to immigrants, rising protectionism, social conservatism, and illiberal democracy 
(itself an oxymoron)?  Will the more balanced and tolerant institutional commitments of 
political liberalism prevail, along with a perhaps modified economic liberalism in which 
open borders and free trade are moderated by more attention to those left behind? For the 
moment, we can’t know.  What we do know is that when populist leaders gain power, 
they make try to good on their promises, to the detriment of the liberal democratic 
consensus.  
 
So what is the alternative?  The big question for progressives who seek to maintain 
liberal democracies is how to counter the populist upsurge with innovative ideas that go 
beyond neo-liberal economics while promoting a renewal of democracy and a more 
egalitarian society.  But this requires not just workable ideas that can provide real 
solutions to the wide range of problems related to economics, politics, and society.  It 
also demands political leaders with persuasive discourses that can resonate with an 
increasingly discontented electorate, more and more open to the sirens of populism.  For 
the moment, we continue to wait not so much for the ideas—in many ways we know 
what they are—but for the discourse of new political leaders able to convey progressive 
ideas in uplifting ways that offer new visions of the future able to heal the schisms on 
which the populists have long thrived.  Without this, hopes of any ‘New Enlightenment’ 
will be dashed on the shoals of illiberalism.  
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